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ON THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY:
THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE
MANUEL VARGAS

ABSTRACT: There is very little study of Latin American philosophy in the English-speaking
philosophical world. This can sometimes lead to the impression that there is nothing of
philosophical worth in Latin American philosophy or its history. The present article offers
some reasons for thinking that this impression is mistaken, and indeed, that we ought to have
more study of Latin American philosophy than currently exists in the English-speaking
philosophical world. In particular, the article argues for three things: (1) an account of
cultural resources that is useful for illuminating the fact of cultural differences and variations
in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the
conclusion that there is demonstrable value to Latin American philosophy and its study.
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1. PHILOSOPHY‟S CULTURE OF SILENCE ABOUT CULTURE
At least in the United States, there are not many philosophers in the “analytic” core of
the profession who make it their task to write about the nature, status, and direction of
culture. What work there is tends to be about the implications of culture, its social
construction and its effects. Almost nothing is done at the level of offering a
fundamental ontology of culture. There are a number of reasons why this might be so.
Perhaps there is a sense that culture is too amorphous a thing for serious, rigorous
philosophical reflection. Perhaps many philosophers simply prefer to avoid running the
risks that are endemic to reflection on culture. Philosophical writing on cultural
differences has been plagued by an unflattering collection of vices—racism, sexism,
Eurocentrism, and so on—so, maybe we are better off passing over these topics in
silence.
Nonetheless, there are things to be said about culture. My aim here is to examine
the relationship of culture to philosophy, and in particular to explore some
consequences of thinking about philosophy in terms of something I call cultural
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resources. This account is not intended to provide anything like an all-encompassing
picture of the fundamental ontology of culture. At best, it is a very small contribution
to a part of that much larger task. All I hope to show is that thinking in terms of
cultural resources can help us make sense of a range of different phenomena, including
one of several values in philosophical work, and the value of doing the history of
philosophy. I go on to extend this account to the somewhat peculiar case of philosophy
done in Latin America, and the issue of whether we ought to treat it as a significant or
relevant part of the study of philosophy in the United States. I will argue that —
contrary to what many might assume— it is plausible that philosophy here in the
United States would have benefited if we had been allocating some resources to the
study of Latin American philosophy all along. So, really, I aim to argue for three things:
(1) the utility of my account of cultural resources for illuminating the fact of cultural
differences and the existence of differences in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for
understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the conclusion that there is
demonstrable value in the study of Latin American philosophy. But first—some
preliminaries.

2. SOME TRUISMS AND OVER-SIMPLICATIONS ABOUT CULTURE
In what follows, I will assume the truth of the following two claims:
(1) There are cultural differences.
(2) Cultural differences can have consequences.
Regarding the first claim — that there are cultural differences — I take it that this
much is obvious. Any doubts you might have about this will go away very rapidly if
you do much traveling. 1 Even though it is easy to get consensus about the fact of
cultural differences, it is remarkably difficult to say philosophically illuminating things
about these differences. Demarcating differences and similarities is no easy task. It is
notoriously difficult to describe cultural differences without building in biased or
otherwise partial assessments of what is being described. Even so, those differences are
there. There are, of course, all the obvious differences we point to in our varied cultural
celebrations — food, music, dance, language — but there are also the harder to specify
differences of implicit values, social organization, and what we might somewhat
romantically call “the rhythms of life.” To a greater and lesser extent all of these
differences, both obvious and subtle, are the domains of various disciplines— cultural
1 One does not have to leave one‟s home country for this to happen. I was born and raised in the U.S.
However, I experienced some degree of culture shock when I moved from the Central Valley of
California to Northern Indiana. What made it especially shocking was that I had recently returned from a
trip to Mexico City, and in comparison, Indiana was considerably more foreign to me than Mexico City
was. I never expected to undergo culture shock in my own country, much less more culture shock than
when visiting a different country.
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anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and so on. But it is notable that most
Anglophone philosophers have had little interaction with these various fields. 2
The second claim, that cultural differences have consequences should be obvious as
well. Empirical work speaks to this claim, but if you accept that there are cultural
differences (which you should), then it would be very difficult to argue that those
differences do not have consequences. Indeed, it is difficult to see how cultural
differences could be obvious and detectable if they did not have consequences.

3. SOME TROUBLES ABOUT CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
So, I will assume the truth of these two ideas: that there are cultural differences, and
that these differences make a difference. This is where the trouble starts, though. Once
we admit that cultural differences can make a difference, it looks like (at least in
principle) there is no reason why the differences made by culture are always positive.
We tend to emphasize the benefits of cultural diversity. We tend to celebrate the
various advantages that multiple cultural affiliations can bring to an organization or to
the life of individuals. But if cultural differences can bring with them various
advantages, there is no obvious reason why they cannot bring with them various
disadvantages. And, this makes cultural differences problematic in a number of ways.
It raises troubling questions about what sorts of cultures individuals, groups, or
populations are better off having. It makes us wonder about both the costs and benefits
of cultural changes. It raises worries about group identity and autonomy. It also raises
worries about whether cultural change is threatening to group identity. But perhaps
most troubling is what happens when the varied benefits and costs of a culture interact
with what Nietzsche called “the instinct for rank.” If cultural differences can make
better and worse differences, you might start to wonder whether there are better and
worse cultures. You might even go on to say things like this:
The fact that, out of the many cultures which have appeared in history, only three
survive — the Indian, the Chinese, and the Western — seems to suggest that these
three possess some particular advantage over the others. In my judgment, this
superiority consists in the fact that the three, in contrast to all the others, contain an
answer (each a radically different one, of course) to the most profound and permanent
questions and needs of man . . .. But while others were unable to supply more than
myths, which in the course of time wear out and lose their charm, or halfway goals
that proved unsatisfactory, the three mentioned above have each found a great clue or
goal which has determined their organization.3
2 On this matter, things are somewhat better in the ostensibly “Continental” parts of the profession. But
my aim here is to offer a philosophical framework for understanding some culturally complex matters
for those parts of the profession not already enriched by systematic reflection on culture. So, consider
this a tentative first step at establishing one kind of bridge between those parts of the profession invested
in reflections on culture and that large part of the profession detached from reflections about culture as
such.
3 I‟ve substituted „Western‟ for the translation‟s „Occidental‟. The original text is (Romero 1949, 403).
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That is a passage from a 1949 essay “Man and Culture” by Francisco Romero,
perhaps the most influential Argentinean philosopher of the 20 th century. It is, I think,
clearly problematic in a number of ways. Among the problems are these: (1) Romero
simply assumes that it is obvious what culture is —but it is not; (2) he gives us no
way to make sense of cultural identity over time: that is, how to understand the idea
that we are talking about the same Western culture from 10AD Athens, Greece to 2009
upstate New York; (3) He seems to assume that the survival of a culture is
straightforwardly a matter of a culture‟s response to issues of meaning and “permanent
questions” and not, for example, a function of accidents of history, technology,
geographic location, and so on; (4) He ignores the fact that there are plenty of cultures
that have survived for considerable time (or that are currently existing) that are not
obviously Western, Chinese, or Indian. For example, there are several varieties of
African cultures, various cultures throughout what we call “The Middle East”, Japan
and other parts of the world, that have had or continue to have considerable longevity;
(5) He does nothing to justify the obviously problematic reduction to umbrella
categories what are, at best, webs of distinct cultures internal to the West, China, or
India; (6) Finally, Romero seems blind to the possibility of cultures that might survive
in various unobvious ways, as in the case of crypto-Judaism, or in Bonfil Batalla‟s idea
that lurking under contemporary Mexico there is a México profundo that is the cultural
legacy of an older Mesoamerican civilization.
So, there are a number of troubling aspects to this passage. Still, we should be
careful not to overclaim what is objectionable about it. Susana Nuccetelli has
maintained “[Romero‟s] assertion plainly implies that the cultures of the indigenous
peoples of Latin America, among others, were inferior compared to the Indian, the
Chinese, and the Western cultures. If Romero is right, the consequence would indeed
be unfortunate, for then the pervasive neglect of indigenous Latin American cultures
would be entirely justified” (Nuccetelli 2002, 83). This diagnosis is erroneous or
misleading on several accounts.
First, we should not be mislead about the inferiority/superiority distinction used by
Romero. In this passage, Romero makes it clear that the sense in which he is evaluating
a culture as superior or inferior simply has to do with its survival. 4 Cultures that
survive for longer (or perhaps, at until the present) are at least with respect to survival
superior to those that do not survive as long (or, perhaps that do not currently survive).
This entails nothing about superiority in some overarching sense, and it entails nothing
about the intrinsic value (or possible lack there of) of these or any other cultures,
including those that have not survived, or have not survived for very long. It is entirely
consistent with what Romero claims in this passage that a culture might have a high
intrinsic value but be inferior with respect to the issue of survival. And, it is entirely
consistent with this that the indigenous people of Latin America might have had

4 This is also consistent with his usage of these ideas in the rest of the chapter from which this passage
is taken.
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cultures that were superior to Indian, Chinese, and Western cultures with respect to
some standard other than survival.
Second, contrary to what Nuccetelli suggests, nothing in the quotation from
Romero speaks to whether “the pervasive neglect of indigenous Latin American
cultures is justified”. Judgments about the longevity of a culture do not entail that
shorter-lived cultures are not worth studying. Nor would this be entailed by something
like a judgment of the all-things-considered superiority of Indian, Chinese, and
Western cultures. That I think Chrysippus is superior to Leibniz does not mean that I
have to think Leibniz isn‟t worth studying, or that we would be justified in neglecting
his work. Similarly, even if Romero were saying that Indian, Chinese, and Western
cultures are all things considered superior cultures, it does not follow that we are
justified in neglecting other cultures. Or, to put the point differently, the justification
for studying a culture need not flow from (i) whether the considered culture is longlived, (ii) whether it is excellent at answering what Romero calls the “profound and
permanent questions and needs of mankind” or (iii) whether it is superior in some all-in
sense. We might have a fully adequate justification for studying a culture if we have
something to learn from it, or if we simply find it interesting. We need not draw the
conclusion that a view like Romero‟s requires that we dismiss indigenous thinking, or
for that matter, the study of Latin American thought more generally.
Although there is still plenty that is problematic about Romero‟s remarks, I do
think there are provocative kernels of truth in them: cultures do vary, cultures provide
resources for individuals and societies, those resources may vary from culture to
culture, and there might be a way to think comparatively about the cultural resources
had by societies. What I‟d like to do now is to think about one way of making sense of
these ideas in a fairly systematic way, and to explore what some of the consequences of
these ideas might be for the value of philosophy.

4. SKETCH OF A THEORY OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
The fundamental nature of culture, the theoretical work of the category, and the
ontological commitments of talk about culture are all subjects of contention across a
variety of disciplines. Fortunately, I am not going to try to say anything interesting
about culture per se. For present purposes, we can define culture as a pattern of learned,
shared norms and attendant behaviors, judgments, and affective responses. One can
surely quibble with aspects of this construal of culture, but nothing much depends on
its particulars. Instead, my focus is on something I will call a cultural resource.
A cultural resource is, in the characteristic case, any entity, practice, pattern of
judgment, or collection thereof whose nature and origin depend at least in part on the
shared norms of a community of intentional agents. 5 To some ears, this may sound
5 This is not intended to be anything like necessary and sufficient conditions for what constitutes a
cultural resource. Instead, my hope is to characterize some of the typical features and functions of
cultural resources, recognizing that there will surely be degenerate cases, cases that only partially or
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very mysterious. The reality of such objects, however, is completely familiar. When I
speak of cultural resources, I speak of ideas or practices with a kind of significance that
depends on the fact of our being intentional, norm-using creatures. So, objects as
diverse as novels, wedding ceremonies, philosophy lectures, telenovelas, birthdays,
felonies, and handshakes all count as cultural resources in my sense. These objects may
be in some sense physical, but their reality is importantly dependent on our collective
mental life; their currency is ideational or symbolic, and their structure is at least partly
given by the cognitive, affective, and behavioral norms in virtue of which the objects
or products are apprehended. The ontology of cultural resources thus has less to do
with the arrangement of physical objects and more to do with the arrangement of new
norms or the reconfiguration of old norms, whatever that comes to.
We might say that cultural resources are the result of the operations of
sophisticated forms of agency in the world. Some cultural resources arise as happy
accidents arising inadvertently. Other times, the development of cultural resources is
the principal aim of an activity. In either case, cultural resources tend to have cultural
utility. Cultural utility is anything that assists in the flourishing, survival, or
perpetuation of a given culture, understood in very broad ways. So, for example, a way
of greeting ones neighbor might have the cultural utility of perpetuating certain kinds
of social relations that are in turn part of a web of practices that jointly contribute to the
survival, flourishing, or perpetuating of a people or culture. Depending on the cultural
resource, cultural utility will frequently overlap with other kinds of utility, for example:
economic, practical, or hedonic utility. However, connections between cultural and
other kinds of utility will typically be contingent and historically bounded.
Cultural production is just that— the production, by whatever means, of cultural
resources. Sometimes this production is original and other times it is reproductive (that
is, reproducing an already existing cultural resource). Cultural resources can also be
renewable resources. That is, a given cultural resource can be repeatedly used as a
source of new or reproductive cultural production. For example, part of a song might
be sampled for a newer musical composition, and in turn that newer composition
(including the sample) might be sampled and transformed for the purposes of a newer
instance of music.6
incompletely manifest the functions and properties I am about to outline. As I use the term, cultural
resources is a broader category than meme (e.g., Dawkins) or cultural capital (Bourdieu). Some
sociologists use a notion of cultural resources to track something like Bourdieu‟s notion of cultural
capital. As will be clear in a bit, if it isn‟t already, I have a somewhat different notion at work in my
account.
6 An example: consider the rhythm line used in Missy Elliott‟s track “Get Ur Freak On.” It was
subsequently sampled, and played backwards as a rhythm line in Bubba Sparxx‟s “Ugly.” Part of what
makes this an innovative instance of cultural resource recycling has to do with the contrasting content of
the songs and the nature of the performer— Missy Elliott is an African American woman touting her sex
appeal (“I look like a Halle Berry poster”) and exhorting listeners to sexual activity whereas Bubba
Sparxx‟s song is about, among other things, his resignation to the fact that he and his friends‟ sexual
appeal is limited (“let‟s face it, none of us will ever date a model . . . it‟s getting ugly”). The significance
of context for cultural recycling can extend out quite broadly from the particulars of a given case.
Cultural recycling can be cultural appropriation, and the mainstreaming of “black” music has historically
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Importantly, cultural resources can range from simple to complex. That is, cultural
resources exist on a continuum of complexity where some resources contain features
that are more complex than others. It is hard to give any well-defined account of these
things, but the idea should be intuitive enough— other things being equal, a symphony
is more complex than a single note, a painting is more complex than a single daub of
color, an epic poem is more complex than a single word.
The distinction between simple and complex cultural resources does not track a
distinction between “high” and “low” culture. Something we learned from both
Shakespeare and Jazz is that low culture resources can turn out to be as complex as any
high culture resource. Moreover, that there is a distinction between simple and
complex cultural resources does not mean that we have perfect epistemic access to
every instance of that distinction. We can be insensitive to complexity for a variety of
reasons. For instance, features of our own culture, or a lack of the right kind of
acculturation, may prevent us from recognizing a complex cultural resource. A striking
example of this kind of imperfect epistemic access comes out in Gunther Schuller‟s
Early Jazz (as quoted in Nussbaum 1997, 163):
Schuller describes the difficulty Western musicologists had in even notating African
music, when they first began to do fieldwork in Africa. Before the fieldwork of Jones
(an Englishman who had lived most of his life in Africa), the expectation of visiting
scholars was that they would encounter „primitive‟ musical forms. But Europeantrained musical ears, accustomed to hearing all voices strike together on a downbeat,
proved unable to notate correctly the complicated polyphonies of African ensemble
music, in which often each of twelve or more voices will go its separate way, weaving
and interweaving. Reconstructions based on the flawed notation seemed to Africans
laughably crude, in the way in which a child‟s copy of complex artwork would seem
crude. Nor could European ears catch the small rhythmic differences that were crucial
to the correct notation of African song, as intervals of a twelfth of a second or less
were routinely deployed by the African performer. European music simply did not
operate with such small rhythmic intervals, so European-trained notators made errors.

This example is remarkable for several reasons. First, it illustrates the difficulty of
recognizing cultural complexity even when presented with it. European musicologists
were not equipped to recognize or detect the complexity that was actually there. In
particular, being familiar with one species of complexity in a domain of culture —for
example, European symphonies— is no guarantee of accurate detection, and in fact
might be a hurdle to it, when dealing with a different species of complexity in the very
same general cultural domain. Second, the example illustrates that cultural complexity
is hardly uniform internal to a culture. That a group of people might have complex
cultural resources in one domain (e.g., symphonic music) does not mean that it
worked through the redeployment of black musical forms by non-black performers. In this case, though,
Missy Elliott was working with considerable success in an already mainstreamed music genre, whereas
the less famous Bubba Sparx (presumably perceived as something of an outsider to the genre even after
it became mainstream) explicitly acknowledges his piggybacking on a version of Missy Elliott‟s beat—
albeit while noting her insistence that her music is “copywritten, so don‟t copy me.” In short, context can
play a large and complex role in determining the content and significance of a recycled cultural resource.

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

VARGAS

40
possesses all the possible complex cultural resources in the more general domain
(music). And, that one has complex cultural resources in music tells us nothing about
whether that group of people has similarly complex cultural resources in other domains.
As the music example reminds us, the possession of economic and technological power
is no guarantee or even an indicator of complex cultural resources in the myriad of
domains of human concern. Writ large, this means that we should not expect that our
society — immensely complex in some economic and technological ways — is
complex in other ways, or even in all ways economic and technological. Similarly, we
should not expect that societies with comparatively simple technological and economic
resources are comparatively simple in most or all domains.
Complex cultural resources provide a distinctive opportunity for reuse. A simple
object usually permits a wide variety of reuses, but a complex cultural resource is
partitionable to a degree unavailable to simples. On one level, a complex cultural
resource typically involves a range of more basic cultural resources, so in some sense it
has the potential utility of whatever its constitutive resources might possess. More
importantly, however, complex cultural resources typically involve an arrangement of
relations among more basic cultural resources that is oftentimes novel, useful, or
illuminating. 7 At least in the typical case (and there are doubtlessly atypical cases), the
greater the complexity, the more ways in which it is likely to have some kind of
usefulness, both as a matter of decomposition into its more basic resources but also in
terms of the relations it suggests or makes possible. Consider, for example, the Iliad.
Without the Iliad, there would be no Aeneid, without which there would be no Inferno,
without which there would be no Paradise Lost, and so on, right up to O Brother
Where Art Thou. One need not appreciate all the resultant products to appreciate that
the cultural utility produced by the Iliad is vast. It is something that was made possible,
if I am right, in substantial part because of the complexity of the work.
Of course, it isn‟t just complexity that accounts for the Iliad‟s fecundity. Partly it is
a matter of how accessible it is to audiences. But this is just to return to the epistemic
point— different objects are differently accessible, and accessibility is a function of
object, context, and perceivers. But that we have imperfect access to complexity does
not mean that it isn‟t there.
In sum, then: (1) the complexity of a cultural resource can be independent of the
knowing powers of any particular individual (2) a resources‟ complexity may have
nothing to do with the ethnic or social-economic status of its producer, (3) and ceteris
paribus, complex cultural resources typically provide more long term cultural utility
than simple cultural resources.

7 It is possible that a simple cultural resource might turn out to be more valuable in the long run than a
complex cultural resource. One never knows what the vagaries of history will make true. But it does
seem to be safer to bet on the long-standing value of a cultural resource with great complexity (like the
Iliad, for instance) than one without a great deal of complexity (a Coca-Cola advertisement, say).
Though, as Andy Warhol taught us, even a Coke ad can turn out to have some potential for cultural reuse.
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What these points allow us to see is how those kernels of truth in Romero‟s
reflections on culture need not be as problematic as they might initially seem. While
we might acknowledge that there may be differences between the number of complex
cultural resources had by a culture or society, these differences need not be connected
to the actual survival of a culture, or its technological or world-historical status.
However, the difference-making elements (the number of complex cultural resources)
will be often be invisible to cultural outsiders. Indeed, as a matter of our actual
epistemic circumstances, it may never be possible to make reliable judgments about
comparative cultural sophistication. But this does not deny that there are genuine
cultural differences, and that differences can and do have real consequences.

5. NEW WORK FOR A THEORY OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
One upshot of my account is that it provides one explanation of why humanities
departments in U.S. universities are vital to the production and preservation of culture.
In our society, universities are one of the primary institutions responsible for the
discovery, development and propagation of complex cultural resources. Of course,
universities have other functions as well. And, other institutions have functions that
overlap with these aspects of a university (e.g., libraries and museums). But a crucial
justification of the university system is its unique role in the traffic of cultural utility.
By preserving, producing, and propagating complex cultural resources, the university
contributes in a profound and systematic way to the attainment of cultural utility—
something that often overlaps with other more familiar forms of utility.
It goes without saying that these functions do not operate in a vacuum. The
relationship of a university system to the other parts of society is also important for
how well a university does with respect to the aims of protecting and producing those
resources with cultural utility. But in the contemporary context an effective university
system will be involved in a complex exchange of cultural resources both internal and
external to the academic world. Individuals and institutions take cultural resources
discovered or propagated internal to an academic context and transform them, in turn
creating new cultural resources (movies, music, literature, tennis shoes, sports, etc.)
which feed back into the academic system.
The humanities, those oft-unappreciated disciplines in the university system, are
deeply involved in the production and preservation of complex cultural resources. The
discipline of philosophy is a species of this more general project of producing and
preserving complex cultural resources. Philosophy shares with other disciplines the
general task of discovering, constructing, and preserving complex ideas with a wide
degree of cultural utility. What is, I think, distinctive about philosophy is that it is
concerned with, roughly, the development and preservation of complex cultural
resources in domains where we have no reliable method for determining truths. This is
why the scope of philosophy is so broad, and at the same time, it is why, if we focus on
identifiable, demonstrable truths that it has produced, those achievements can fade to
invisibility. On the model I am suggesting, philosophy is, roughly, our collective
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attempt to puzzle out issues in just those contexts where we have no reliable method
for determining what is probably true. When we do determine a methodology that is
reliable in some domain, and we can point to markers of its success, we tend to regard
it as something other than philosophy in the strict and proper sense (Vargas 2007, 64).
But this is only to say that the barrenness of philosophy is only apparent. If, instead, we
conceive of it as a field that specializes in generating tools and ideas for precisely those
places where we have impoverished ways of understanding things, philosophy‟s
contribution becomes more visible. Indeed, by this measure, the body of complex
cultural resources produced by philosophers likely outstrips most known disciplines.
(Please note that this story does not exclude the possibility of other accounts of the
value of the humanities, philosophy, and so on! I believe that there are other, nonmutually-exclusive accounts of the value of these things, but the present argument shall
just make use of this particular conception of the value of these things.)
This also goes some distance towards explaining why the study of the history of
philosophy should have an important place in the profession and teaching of
philosophy. The history of philosophy is the history of a succession of immensely
complex cultural resources, by some of our best minds. Although our current beliefs
differ significantly, and in some cases differ radically from the presuppositions of
many historical figures, we cannot say in advance which historical ideas will turn out
to have utility in the future. We cannot anticipate when some conceptual innovation,
some idea, or some turn of argument will yield a new framework for understanding
ourselves, or the universe. However, one effective way of aiding this process is to not
lose track of those innovations, ideas, and arguments that we have already developed.
The only way to preserve our access to those resources, then, is to ensure that our
community of scholars includes those whose business it is to study the history of
philosophy. Only then can we have some hope of not losing the resources that are
already ours. This task requires genuine, dedicated scholars. It is not a simple matter to
study resources created in a context remote from our own. Recall those African
musicians whose music was so badly reproduced by early European musicologists.
Thus far, my account has been operating at a fairly abstract level of description. It
may help to think about a handful of concrete cases of what are at least prima facie
examples of the sort of complex cultural resources developed, discovered, and/or
propagated by the discipline of philosophy. Here are three examples.
Social expectations and the construction of individual capacities
An important recurrent theme in foundational philosophical work on gender and race
has been the idea that social expectations can construct the kinds of capacities that
people have. So, for example, Dubois argued that social expectations concerning
“Negroes” structured the actual capacities they came to have. And, perhaps even more
famously, John Stuart Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft each argued that social
expectations about women structured the kinds of capacities that women have (Mill
1869). If you don‟t believe that women are capable of scientific achievement, then you
won‟t bother to provide them with the sort of education required for scientific
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achievement. As a result, in societies with those expectations, few if any women will
have the requirements for producing scientific achievements, which in turn vindicates
the view that women lack the capacity for serious scientific work.
Values and theory underdetermination
Over the past few decades there has been an interesting discussion in the philosophy of
science on the appropriate role of values and social and political ends in the
interpretation of scientific data (Anderson 1995, 27-58). An important development in
this literature was the argument, advanced by some feminist epistemologists and
philosophers of science, that value-laden aims (e.g., the aim of gender equity) play an
appropriate role in theory selection in cases where the evidence underdetermines what
scientific theory we should accept. And, since the evidence at least very frequently is
consistent with a range of possible scientific theories, value-laden selection of theories
may be frequently permissible. Although this remains a subject of dispute, it is clear
that reflections on these issues have constituted a general contribution to philosophical
reflections on knowledge and scientific theorizing.
The relevance of psychology for ethics and political philosophy
In her landmark 1958 paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy” G.E.M. Anscombe argued
that we cannot profitably engage in normative ethics without having a better grasp of a
range of psychological issues (Anscombe 1981, 26-42). This is an idea that is picked
up and developed by a number of influential figures in moral political philosophy,
including Richard Brandt and even (surprisingly enough) John Rawls. In his essay
“The Independence of Moral Theory” Rawls writes that:
the further advance of moral philosophy depends upon a deeper understanding of the
structure of moral conceptions and of their connections with human sensibility . . . We
must not turn away from this task because much of it may appear to belong to
psychology or social theory and not to philosophy. For the fact is that others are not
prompted by philosophical inclination to pursue moral theory; yet this motivation is
essential for without it the inquiry has the wrong focus” (Rawls 1999, 302).

Only recently have philosophers begun to make good on these calls to action,
attempting to incorporate work in the various sciences of the mind with philosophical
work in ethics and normative theory (Doris and Stich 2005). Though this project is still
young, it is clearly bearing important fruit. Empirically informed work on
philosophical intuitions, character traits, the nature of rationality, moral motivation,
and so on, are increasingly important for some branches of normative philosophy.
This trio of ideas (or collections of ideas) are instances of complex cultural
resources. These ideas have considerable utility, or at least promise of utility, and they
are the kinds of things with a wide range of re-application and downstream fecundity.
And, I think, the development and propagation of these resources constitute a cultural
achievement that philosophy can rightly claim as its own.
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6. THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE
Suppose you accept my account of complex cultural resources, and suppose you accept
the global account of what the humanities (and philosophy) are engaged in.
Additionally, let us suppose you accept that the examples I have offered constitute
prima facie good cases for a complex cultural resource of the sort that philosophy is
appropriately concerned with. Now let us turn to the Latin American case. Is there any
reason to think that Latin American philosophy might have similar value, from the
perspective of a concern for complex cultural resources? I believe that a compelling
case can be made for the conclusion that there are valuable complex cultural resources
in Latin American philosophy, and consequently, that it merits sustained scholarly
attention in the United States.8
Note, though, that even if we currently have no reason for thinking that the study
of Latin American philosophy will yield the discovery, production, or preservation of
complex cultural resources, the general philosophical community in the United States
simply isn‟t in a position to make a negative assessment about the value of Latin
American philosophy as a field of study. Given the fact that there is little or no
systematic study of Latin American philosophy in the United States, it would surely be
premature to draw a negative conclusion on the basis of a failure to gather evidence.
This would be akin to deciding that a particular person has nothing valuable to say —
without having ever bothered to speak to that person, without having read anything that
person has written, and without learning anything at all about that person. So, to be in a
position to make a negative assessment we would first have to learn something about
Latin American philosophy.
Conveniently enough, however, there is excellent evidence that Latin American
philosophy can and has made contributions of complex cultural resources comparable
to the ones I‟ve cited above. Consider the following passage from Sor Juana Inés de la
Cruz (de la Cruz 2004, 59-60):
You foolish and unreasoning men
Who cast all blame on women,
Not seeing you yourselves are cause
Of the same faults you accuse
. . . You combat their firm resistance,
And then solemnly pronounce
that what you‟ve won through diligence
is proof of women‟s flightiness . . . .
. . . .Why then are you so alarmed
8 None of what follows precludes the possibility that Latin American philosophy is valuable on other
grounds. I am sure that it is. However, what follows is an argument for why given the present account of
cultural resources, it is plausible to think that Latin American philosophy is valuable and worth studying.
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by the fault that is your own?
Wish women to be what you make them,
Or make them what you wish they were.9

The poem from which this is taken, as well as a letter written in defense of her pursuit
of education in the late 1600s, are well-established texts in the canon of Latin
American philosophical texts, and familiar to some readers versed in the history of
feminism. Part of their importance centers on the issue she gives expression to in the
above passages: social expectations and social context structure the capacities and
dispositions of people of her time, and in particular, a strongly patriarchal social
structure is what made women the kinds of persons (flighty, unlearned, etc.) faulted by
the men of that time. This is, of course, to make the point that social expectations can
play an essential role in the construction of capacities in people. And it is a point that
was made by a woman philosopher —a Mexican nun —, in a philosophical context,
literally centuries before similar claims by John Stuart Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft, and
W.E.B. Dubois. So, a complex cultural resource like the idea that social expectations
can structure capacities of individuals and groups not only can be developed in the
Latin American philosophical context— it was developed there, and earlier at that.10
I now want to turn to briefly consider the work of a more recent Latin American
philosopher, José Vasconelos. Though he wrote extensive treatises on metaphysics,
aesthetics, and the history of philosophy, in the United States Vasconcelos is
principally known (if he is known at all) for his work, especially in The Cosmic Race,
on philosophical issues about race, and in particular, his promotion of race mixing in
Latin America. However, some of his best work is in a neglected essay from Aspects of
Mexican Civilization. There, he concludes that the scientific evidence about the
benefits and costs of race mixing are unclear. The available biological, genetic, and
cultural data of his time did not, in his judgment, settle whether race mixing is
generally positive, or even what its principle effects might be. What is interesting,
though, is what he goes on to argue. Vasconelos maintains that practical or normative
considerations can play an appropriate role in theory selection, especially in light of the
particular cultural role played by theories of mixed race. As he puts it: “If all nations
then build theories to justify their policies or to strengthen their deeds, let us develop in
Mexico our own theories; or, at least, let us be certain, that we choose among the
foreign theories of thought that stimulate our growth, rather than restrain it.”

9 In Gracia and Millán-Zaibert, eds. Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century, Amherst, NY:
Prometheus, 2004, pp. 59-60.
10 Notice that the success or failure of the argument does not directly hinge on chronology. I mention
chronology for two reasons, though. First, the earlier advent of these ideas in Latin America makes it
clear that their development in Latin America weren‟t simply later appropriations of the more familiar
examples known to Anglophone philosophers. Second, the development of a valuable notion elsewhere
can suggest the possibility that the utility of that idea might have become available to us (in the
Anglophone world) sooner if we had been paying closer attention to philosophical work in Latin
America. I return to this idea and its limitations later in the article.

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

VARGAS

46
(Vasconcelos 1926, 96)11 His view is not just that we can pick any scientific theory we
like. We are appropriately constrained by what the available empirical data shows.
However, in cases where the data does not favor one particular theory over another,
and given that the issue is something we have reason to settle, then consideration of
things like cultural uplift, national development, and so on, can provide adequate
reason to favor one view over another. And, as he observes, these value-laden
considerations drive theory construction in a good number of cases.
Vasconcelos‟ move is, of course, the kind of thing that has been said in recent
debates in the philosophy of science and in epistemology. And, notably, Vasconcelos‟
explicit use of this idea antedates by half a century the deployment of these ideas in the
context of Anglo-American epistemology and philosophy of science. 12
I want to conclude by briefly considering the work of one more philosopher in the
Latin American canon. In 1934, the Mexican philosopher Samuel Ramos published an
extremely influential book, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico (Ramos 1962). In
that work, he endeavored to describe the character flaws and attendant cultural defects
of then-contemporary Mexicans. Though the book was part of an already existing
tradition of Latin American speculation about what was flawed or problematic about
various national or regional characters 13, Ramos‟ book spawned several generations of
competing and counter-diagnoses of widely variable philosophical sophistication, the
most prominent of which is Octavio Paz‟s Labyrinth of Solitude. What is remarkable
about Ramos‟ text is his insistence that the key to understanding the moral and cultural
defects of Mexicans is to be found in the careful deployment of scientific psychology,
particularly the work of Alfred Adler. On Ramos‟ model, moral psychology is subject
to regional variation, and variations can only be illuminatingly studied against the
backdrop of an empirically informed investigation in to the psychological mechanisms
that underpin moral, social, and political phenomena. Similarly, any normative theory
about how Mexicans ought to be, whether morally, culturally, or politically, would
have to be similarly sensitive to the best going accounts of psychology (especially what
we would now call social psychology). Of course, Ramos‟s vision of these things, and
his use of Adler are importantly at odds with what we would recognize as the best
current accounts of human psychology. But that is not the point. The point is that as
early as 1934, there were philosophers who thought that normative theory needed to be
informed by empirically adequate pictures of human beings. 14 In other words, this
11 These remarks are echoed in La raza cósmica, where it is clearer the way in which this sort of view
is of a piece with views about metaphysics and epistemology (Vasconcelos 1997).
12 It is also worth recognizing that Vasconcelos‟ deployment of underdetermination is also
comparatively early in the history of this idea. While versions of it show up prior to Vasconcelos‟ work
(e.g., the late 19th century), his use of this idea nevertheless antedates (for example), Quine‟s famous
discussion of theory underdetermination.
13 This tradition extends well back to the origins of Western philosophical and proto-philosophical
reflection in and about Latin America— including early figures such as Sepulveda, Vitoria, and
Garcilaso de la Vega.
14 One might reply that something true has been going on for much longer in the Anglo-American
tradition. One might cite Herbert Spencer, for instance. But Latin American positivists (inspired by
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too constitutes prima facie evidence that there are complex cultural objects to be found
in Latin American philosophical work that antedates similar achievements in the
Anglo-American context.
These examples all derive from philosophical work on race, identity, and gender in
Latin America. To those familiar with the history of Latin American philosophy, this
will be no surprise at all. Social and political philosophy, of which discussions about
culture, ethnicity, race, and gender all play a part, has been something of first
philosophy in much of the various strands of Latin American philosophy. So, if there
were something of value to be found in the context of Latin American philosophy, it
would likely be found in these areas, areas where Latin American philosophical
traditions are complex and long-standing
Still, it is plausible that with more detailed scholarship, we might successfully
challenge whether one or more of the examples really do constitute an instance of
anticipating ideas well known and celebrated in the Anglo-American tradition. Or
perhaps there are genre considerations that might incline us to throw out one of these
works. For what it is worth, I think these examples will hold up well to extended
scrutiny. And, we would do well to remember that the history of philosophy is littered
with instances where recognizably philosophical works were produced in genres other
than those we currently favor.15 But all this would be to miss the point. My aim is not
to convince you that these cases really do constitute important anticipations of the
Anglo-American tradition. Rather, my point is that we have good prima facie evidence
for thinking that if genuinely complex cultural resources are to be found in philosophy
they can be found in Latin American philosophy.

7. FURTHER OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
What might a determined critic say in reply to the general line of argument I have been
developing thus far? I find it remarkable that the most common reply is not one that
rejects the substance of the argument, or one that takes issue with my account of the
worth of philosophy and Latin American philosophy‟s similar worth. Instead, the most
Comte) were committed to scientific approaches to the study of moral and social theory around the same
period. And if you really want to push dates, one might construe the position of Las Casas in the famous
debate at Valladolid (in the 1600s) as hinging, in part, on the idea that natural slave theory and the
resultant political theory presumed an empirically irresponsible picture of human motivation and
practices. One might reply by finding an even earlier figure who thought that normative theory in one or
another domain could not fruitfully proceed without getting some of the empirical facts straight.
Irrespective of how all of this all turns out, it should be clear that there is an interesting discussion to be
had about these things. Perhaps the figures we typically celebrate as having sparked this development
might well have been unneeded had we had a philosophical community familiar with ideas produced in
Latin America.
15 For example, if we are to judge as “not philosophical” any work done in the genre of poetry, we
would have to dismiss many works by pre-Socratics, as well as important texts such as Lucretius‟ De
Rerum Natura. It would certainly have come as a surprise to many figures in the post-Hellenic period of
philosophy to learn that Lucretius‟ work did not count as philosophy.
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common reply is, as best as I can make out, one that insists on moving the goalposts.
So, I am told, even though the argument may work as far as it goes, before we bother
with the business of Latin American philosophy what we really need is proof that there
is some worthwhile idea in it now, some idea that does not already have currency in
Anglophone philosophy. This, I am told, is the kind of evidence we need before we
invest resources into the study of Latin American philosophy.
I am convinced this demand can be met, but I remain skeptical that were I to meet
it, the goalposts wouldn‟t move once again. If showing that 20 th century Anglophone
philosophy would have benefited from attention to the history of Latin American
philosophy up through the 1940s is not sufficient to make the case for its worth, then I
doubt that making the case of 21st century Latin American philosophy will suddenly
unleash a torrent of support among my Anglophone philosophical brethren. And why
should it? Anything I would cite as a novel case of innovation that doesn‟t have a track
record in the Anglophone philosophical community could be dismissed precisely
because it lacks that track record.
On the one hand, unless the critic already shares a conviction expressed in the
purported innovation or idea, the purported innovation can be readily dismissed as
insufficiently innovative, mistaken, or otherwise unpromising precisely because its
features are not accepted by the critic, because the intellectual context that make it
plausible is unfamiliar, or because there is no track record of esteem in which the idea
is held by those the critic holds in high regard. On the other hand, if the critic already
shares a conviction expressed in the purported innovation, then here too the example
will fail to persuade. After all, it is no innovation to highlight an idea already had by
the critic. So, the situation is dire.
Of course, a critic could be satisfied if I produced evidence of the philosophical
worth of contemporary Latin American philosophy. And, for the record, I provided
such evidence, elsewhere (Vargas 2007, 77 n.14). Still, my sense is that philosophers
of good will will not need a further argument from the fecundity of contemporary Latin
American philosophy, and any critic insufficiently moved by what I have already
offered might, without much effort, manufacture some further reason for ongoing
dissatisfaction with the new examples I would adduce. 16
A different objection challenges the very idea of there being a significant problem
with the ongoing failure of philosophers in the Anglophone world to study and teach
philosophy produced in Latin America. There are different strands of this argument.
One strand focuses on the very idea of Latin American philosophy, and argues that it is
a red herring, as there is properly only philosophy. Regional or cultural locations are
irrelevant to considerations of philosophical worth and whether the work merits
attention. A second strand is content to accept that it may make sense to speak of
regional, national, or linguistic groupings of philosophy, but goes on to deny that there
is any real barrier to the study of these things because we never criticize philosophical

16 For a lengthier discussion of the barriers facing the acceptance of Latin American philosophy, see
Vargas 2007, and for potential cultural barriers, see also Gracia 2000.
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work for being Latin American or otherwise. We criticize philosophical work for being
bad, unrigorous, ill-conceived, or wrong.
Regarding the first strand, the denial of the relevance of regional philosophy, the
matter is surprisingly complicated. First of all, it is not clear that we never think about
philosophy in terms of regional, national, or linguistic clusterings. When we speak of
American philosophy, it is generally understood that this refers to philosophers
working in the U.S. in various frameworks of conviction (e.g., pragmatism,
transcendentalism) prior to the arrival of logical positivists fleeing wartime Europe.
Similarly, I trust that it is recognizable what one has in mind, more or less, when we
speak of French philosophy, African philosophy, and Chinese philosophy. Second, it is
worth noting that there has been a lively debate (especially within Latin American
philosophy) about whether it makes sense to think of regional or local philosophy.
Third, and most importantly, even if we put aside current practice and accept the view
that philosophy is either just philosophy or it is not philosophy, the basic argument
goes through. We can say that there is a body of “just” philosophy (i.e., philosophy
without reference to some regional moniker) that happens to be almost entirely
produced in Latin America and that through sheer happenstance tends to be principally
written in a language that is neither written in English nor one of the Big Four
“philosophical” languages (i.e., French, German, Greek, or Latin), and that as a matter
of unremarkable historical contingency is virtually never studied or taught in the core
of the discipline in the United States. Fine. At that point, the present argument is
simply this: given that this body of philosophical work (label it however you like) has
some valuable cultural resources in it, resources that are worth studying, then we
should study it. Since we largely do not, we should do things differently than we are
doing them. 17
The second thread of the “there is no problem here” objection, (i.e., that there is no
barrier to the study because Latin American-ness is never grounds for criticism of
philosophical work) is unduly optimistic. Suppose it is true that Latin American-ness is
never grounds for criticizing philosophical work, even indirectly. Even so, there would
remain significant institutional and practical barriers to the study of Latin American
philosophy. For graduate programs with foreign language requirements, students
virtually never need to offer justification or demonstration of the utility of the Big Four
languages for the study of philosophy. Anecdotally, the situation is not the same for
Spanish and Portuguese. Moreover, for students interested in writing a dissertation in
Latin American philosophy, there is virtually no top-30 graduate program in
17 There is sometimes a different aspect to the first strand (or depending on how one individuates these
things, perhaps a further strand) that may bear some mention. The complaint I have in mind goes
something like this: for all I have said, I haven‟t shown what is special about Latin American philosophy.
In reply: it is special in the only way that matters to this argument: it is valuable and ignored. Nothing
turns on it being special in the sense of being radically different, laden with privileged insights, different
from all other philosophical work, or the like. Rather, the point is that it is philosophy—in an
uncontroversially Western, full-blooded sense of the term—and for whatever reason(s) it is not studied
in any of the most influential parts of the field. The present article is one argument among many possible
arguments for why we should try to change that fact.
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philosophy where one can go and expect to have an advisor competent enough to direct
such a dissertation.18 This generates a double burden on students interested in Latin
American philosophy: if they wish to have access to the best education and the best
subsequent opportunities in the profession, they will have to work in at least two fields
—something that already has currency and representation among influential
Anglophone Ph.D.-granting departments— while effectively committing themselves to
the life of an autodidact in Latin American philosophy. Perhaps that is just the kind of
cost that will need to be paid in the growth and study of the field. I mention these
things, though, because the mere fact (if that is what it is) that Latin American-ness is
never a barrier to the study of Latin American philosophy, does nothing to mitigate the
very limited and impoverished paths of access to what valuable complex cultural
resources there are to be found in Latin American philosophy. So, again, I think the
basic structure of the argument remains: there is something valuable here, we would do
well to study it, but doing that would be something different than what we are in fact
doing.
Let us therefore return to the main line of argument. As to the question of whether
or not there is reason to believe that there is value to be had in studying Latin
American philosophy the answer is clearly yes. Given that we are (or ought to be)
committed to the value of complex cultural resources, Latin American philosophy
clearly satisfies the test of meriting sustained scholarly attention in the United States.
Indeed, if we had always had a tradition of scholarship on Latin American thought,
already internal to the discipline of philosophy within the United States, these ideas
(expectations constructing abilities, theory underdetermination, and the importance of
empirical psychology) — which are widely regarded as important developments 19 in
the United States — would have been ideas to which we already had access. These
cultural achievements would have become resources that were available to us to deploy
decades and even centuries earlier than they were developed in the Anglo-American
context. Failing this, even concurrent or after-the-fact awareness of similar ideas in a
different context might prove to be interestingly valuable: the fact of a different
deployment or circumstance of development of some idea might itself be illuminating
18 In speaking “top-30” departments, I am thinking of the Philosophical Gourmet Report. Rankings of
philosophy Ph.D. programs is a notoriously controversial matter, and I do not mean to here take a stand
on the whether and how of ranking graduate programs. A different measure of the strength of graduate
programs in philosophy might generate a different story— perhaps as many as two graduate programs in
a different top-30 would have a scholar who works on Latin American philosophy. The basic point,
though, would remain the same: even if there is no criticism of Latin American philosophy and
philosophers on grounds of being Latin American, this does not mean that students of philosophy can
undertake the study of works in Latin American philosophy with the same ease, seriousness, and
professional promise with which they might study the work or ideas of Descartes, Nietzsche, or David
Lewis.
19 Of course, that something is an important development does not mean that one thinks that the
development gets the facts of the matter right. You needn‟t think they get things right to believe that
they are valuable, important, or worth studying. But, in virtue of being complex and worth engagement,
they might, after all, spark more accurate proposals by way of refutation of these ideas. Either way, we
are likely better off with these ideas.
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about the considered idea or phenomenon. This is not to say that these benefits will
always obtain, or that a given idea would have had the same effect in one time as at an
earlier time (perhaps they would have had different, and perhaps differently valuable
effects, or none whatsoever). However, inasmuch as it is prima facie valuable to have a
wide storehouse of complex cultural resources at our disposal, it behooves us to be
interested in acquiring those resources that have been developed in the Latin American
tradition.
Of course, similar arguments might well be made about Indian, Chinese, and
perhaps African philosophy. There are various analogies and disanalogies that hold
between these cases. For example, among these, only Latin American philosophy is
clearly a part of the Western philosophical tradition and clearly concerned with similar
issues, figures, and methods. But if similar arguments can be given to favor these other
families of philosophy, and these traditions show a promise of similar fecundity, then
there should be space at the academic table for research in these fields, too.
Even so, we should not downplay real-world constraints on expanding the contents
of a discipline without expanding the numbers of philosophers. Moreover, there is also
an issue of diminishing utility to one‟s own work that comes from being in a context in
which everyone is working on significantly different research programs. These things
will constrain the resources we pour in to the study of any field, and there are surely no
hard and fast principles governing how these resources should be allocated.
Nevertheless, Latin American philosophy merits more attention than it has thus far
received.
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